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This paper estimates the eﬀective market-access granted under
NAFTA in textiles and apparel by combining two approaches. First,
we estimate the eﬀect of tariﬀ preferences and rules of origin on the
border prices of Mexican final goods exported to the US and of US
intermediates exported to Mexico. We find that one third of the es-
timated rise in the border price of Mexican apparel products com-
pensates for the cost of complying with NAFTA’s rules of origin. We
also find that the price of US intermediates exported to Mexico is
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estimates, suggest little market-access improvement for Mexican ex-
porters.
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1 Introduction
Two recent developments in the international trading system have attracted
increasing attention. First, increased market access for Developing Countries
(DCs) has been heralded as key for their successful integration into the world
market, and also as a sine qua non condition for successful completion of
the Doha “development round” negotiations. Initiated by the GSP in the
1970s, non-reciprocal preferential market access had a recent revival with
the EU’s “Everything But Arms” initiative and the US’s Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act. In parallel, preferential trading agreements have recently
flourished with over 250 currently in operation, over 90% of which are Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) rather than deeper forms of integration.
A number of these FTAs are of the North-South type (e.g. NAFTA,
EUROMED, and other preferential schemes under negociation such as the
FTAA or the EPAs between the EU and ACP countries). In all cases im-
proved market access for Southern partners is a big part of their justification.
While it has long been established that, because of trade diversion, preferen-
tial market access has ambiguous welfare eﬀects, for those arguing for special
and diﬀerential treatment in that form (e.g. Hoekman, Michalopoulos and
Winters, 2004), the implicit view is that at least part of the rents associated
with trade barriers get transferred to DCs.
Notwithstanding the trade-diversion issue, how much market access is
really being granted under those arrangements is a matter of debate. Ex-
post assessments of the eﬀects of FTAs have concentrated on measuring their
impact on trade flows, and have on the whole found quite limited eﬀects.1
One of the primary suspects for the disappointing trade-expansion eﬀects
of PTAs is the presence of often stiﬀ Rules of Origin (RoO). RoO constrain
the sourcing policies of final-good producers, generating higher input costs as
well as administrative compliance costs. Recent studies relying on utilization
1Early ex-post empirical assessments of the eﬀect of PTAs (see e.g. Yeats, 1998) focused
on trade flows rather than prices. Recent studies on how RoO aﬀect market access in PTAs
(Estevadeordal, 2000; Anson et al., 2004; Cadot et al., forthcoming) have also focussed on
patterns of utilization rates and trade flows. Lack of data on utilization rates has precluded
carrying out similar exercices in the case of the EU. However, Brenton and Manchin
(2003) and Brenton (2004) have also noted that many exporters from Eastern Europe
have preferred to continue exporting under OPT arrangements in spite of presumably
greater market access under the FTA. Kala Krishna (2005) summarizes the theoretical
ltterature on RoO.
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rates of preferences (Estevadeordal, 2000; Anson et al., 2005; Cadot et al.,
2004; Carrère and de Melo, 2004) have uncovered evidence of non-negligible
compliance costs.
Examining trade flows, however, gives no information on the distribution
of the rents generated by trade preferences. In order to make further progress
and assess the welfare eﬀects of market access under FTAs, one would want
to estimate the eﬀects of preferences on prices rather than quantities or
utilization rates.2 This would imply estimating the pass-through of tariﬀ
preferences (as first done by Kreinin, 1961), an exercise similar to the familiar
estimation of exchange-rate pass-through. A small but growing literature,
has recently taken that route.3
Two papers have recently estimated the eﬀects of trade preferences on
member-country prices in North-South agreements using the Textile and Ap-
parel (T&A) sector, where preferences are typically substantial. Olarreaga
and Ozden (2003) looked at AGOA’s eﬀect on the unit values of US apparel
imports from Africa, and Ozden and Sharma (2004) explored rent capture
by apparel producers from the Caribbean Basin Initiative.4 These papers
2Winters (1997) shows that the welfare eﬀects of a PTA must be assessed on the basis
of price changes, as a reduction in the volume of trade can be associated with an increase
in welfare.
3Modelling interaction between member and non-member exporters à la Bertrand,
Chang and Winters (2002) analyzed Mercosur’s eﬀect on the price of member and non-
member imports into the Brazilian. They found a combination of Argentine pass-through
and/or strategic price cuts by non members.
4Olarreaga and Ozden (2003) calculated unit values using the ITC’s trade value and
volume data disaggregated at the HS-8 level over 2000-2002. Instead of expressing the
unit values of African imports relative to those of other sources, they used the fact that
US customs report shipments separately by regime claimed (AGOA, MFN or other) to
compare AGOA prices with MFN prices for the same good and country. This is possible
only when utilization rates are strictly between zero and one (more on this later). The
ratio of price increase to tariﬀ preference ranges between 6% for Madagascar and 81% for
South Africa, with an export-weighted average of 30%. Olarreaga and Ozden explored
further the role of market power by regressing this ratio on an ad-hoc measure of buyer
concentration (based on the distribution of garment sales across US ports of entry) and
found its eﬀect to be negative and statistically significant. In a similar exercise using the
same data source, Ozden and Sharma (2004) explored rent-capture by apparel producers
from Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries. They estimated that CBI countries
retained about two thirds of the preference margin and that their ability to retain rents
was reduced by competition from Mexico after NAFTA was formed.
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find that preferences do translate into higher border prices for preferred ex-
porters, although pass-through of the tariﬀ reductions is also substantial
(between one-third and one-half).5 However, the premise that higher border
prices imply higher rents for producers is not necessarily true. First, as noted
by Olarreaga and Ozden, middlemen in the exporting country may capture
part of the increase in the border price, and those middlemen may in fact
be large companies based in the importing country. Second, as Ozden and
Sharma note in their concluding remarks, part of the border price increase
may simply cover the additional cost of complying with rules of origin (higher
input prices and other administrative costs).
We explore this hypothesis using T&A trade data for NAFTA extending
the approach of the last two papers. Like Olarreaga and Ozden, we compare
border prices for preferential and MFN apparel shipments using unit values
calculated from ITC trade data at the HS8 level. Like Ozden and Sharma, we
regress these border-price diﬀerences on tariﬀ-preference margins and control
variables. Unlike them, however, we do not include quantity variables, but
instead include a vector of dummy variables for RoO using a database com-
piled by Estevadeordal (2000). In a second step, based on those estimates,
we resort to simulation techniques to calculate the likely market-access im-
provement for Mexican exporters of apparel to the US under NAFTA.
We also explore empirically a conjecture made in Cadot, Estevadeordal
and Suwa (2004) according to which the political function of RoO in NAFTA
is to create a captive market for US intermediates. If such is the case, the
price of US intermediates should be sensitive to RoO and tariﬀ preferences
downstream. We test this hypothesis by regressing the border price of US
intermediate goods exported to Mexico (relative to the border price of those
same goods when exported to other, non preferential destinations) on RoO
and tariﬀ preferences applied by the US on downstream (re-exported) Mex-
ican goods. Vertical linkages are captured using an input-output table.
To anticipate our main conclusions, when we do not control for RoO,
the elasticity of border prices to tariﬀ-preference margins is close to 80%.6
5We define pass-through in the conventional way, i.e. as a measure of the transmission
of changes in exporters’ costs to changes in importing-country prices. That is, full pass-
through by Mexican exporters means that an x% tariﬀ preference (a decrease in exporter
costs) translates into an x% US-price decrease (nothing retained by Mexican producers)
and conversely.
6That is, a reduction of NAFTA tariﬀs below MFN tariﬀs by x percentage points
4
After controlling for RoO, however, we find that Mexican apparel producers
retain only just about half of the preference margin. We also find that RoO
and tariﬀ preferences downstream indeed aﬀect US intermediate-good prices
in a statistically significant way and that US intermediate-good producers
are able to retain a sizable proportion of the rents generated by Mexican
preferential tariﬀs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a simple analytical
framework that illustrates the basic issues and prepares the ground for the
econometric estimation and simulations that follow. Section 3 estimates pass-
through in the Textile & Apparel sector on the Mexican and US side. Based
on these results, illustrative simulations in section 4 are used to investigate
the sensitivity of Mexican apparel producers to NAFTA preferences under
prevailing RoO. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preference pass-through and RoO
2.1 Trade in Textiles & Apparel
The first issue that should be clarified in a model attempting to track the
price eﬀects of tariﬀ preferences is market structure. At one extreme, as
in e.g. Ozden and Sharma (2004), the US final-good market is taken as
perfectly competitive, Mexican supply being too small to saturate it. The
retail price of final goods on the US market is then simply their (MFN)
tariﬀ-ridden price. The rent potentially appropriable by Mexican exporters
is the tariﬀ-preference margin. At the other extreme, noting that there
is product diﬀerentiation in apparel, one can model the price interaction
between member and non-member country exporters in a Bertrand game as
in e.g. Chang and Winters (2000) and Winters and Chang (2002). This
approach has the advantage of bringing into the analysis strategic eﬀects
that are necessarily left out of a competitive model. In terms of our focus
on rents, the upshot is that the rent potentially appropriable by Mexican
exporters is diminished by the strategic price cuts of non-member exporters.
The T&A sector under study here has a peculiar market structure. Vir-
tually all non-preferential trade in T&A products has been governed by the
translates into an increase in Mexican producer prices by 0.8x percentage points, or a 20%
pass-through.
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Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), successor of the Multi-Fiber
Agreement (MFA). Under the ATC, agreed upon as part of the Uruguay
Round, quotas on garments were to be progressively enlarged until final
phase-out in January 2005. However importing countries backloaded the
enlargement of binding quotas until the very end of the transition phase,
i.e. until the end of 2004 (on this, see e.g. Spinanger 1998). Thus, during
our sample period (2000-2002), most of the world’s non-preferential trade in
garments was still aﬀected by binding quotas.
Intra-NAFTA trade in T&A, by contrast, has been governed by Annex
300B of the NAFTA treaty, which superseded the MFA and the ATC and
mandated the gradual elimination of tariﬀs and quotas.7 Under a regime of
binding quantitative restrictions on non-preferred exporters, price interaction
between Mexican producers and outside (non-NAFTA) exporters was non-
existent as Mexicans were operating along a residual demand curve whose
elasticity was unaﬀected by the pricing decisions of quota-constrained com-
petitors, justifying our modelling approach neglecting strategic interactions.
The model briefly outlined below is a hybrid, featuring monopolistic com-
petition with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences on the final-good market but dis-
regarding price competition between suppliers. In the simulation exercise
of section 4, by contrast, we adopt the so-called “Armington framework”
whereby apparel products imported into the US are diﬀerentiated by origin,
which implies less than full rent capture by Mexican exporters even without
RoO on intermediates.8
2.2 The model
Suppose that n Mexican final goods (say clothing) indexed by j, are sold
on the US market in competition with goods imported from the rest of the
world. Let xj and x∗j be the amounts of Mexican and “foreign” goods sold
respectively (“foreign” referring to imports from the rest of the world). There
is no US production of final goods. Let also x0 be an aggregate of other goods
7The North American Free Trade Agreement Treaty, Annex 300B, section 1, §2.
8To shorten the presentation of the simulation model in section 4, we note in this
section all instances in which the simulation model departs from the structure presented
here.
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consumed by US households. Preferences are
U(.) = X0 +
nX
j=1
lnXj
where
Xj =
£
x
ρj
j +
¡
x∗j
¢ρj¤1/ρj .
The quasi-linearity of U ensures that the marginal utility of income is con-
stant and equal to one, while the log form of the second term ensures that
an interior budget allocation holds between the n Mexican goods and other
ones. This means that tariﬀ changes have no income eﬀects, an assumption
maintained in the simulations of section 4. Additivity of preferences implies
strong separability, so two-stage budgeting holds, confining the price eﬀects
of tariﬀ preferences to apparel products. The elasticity of substitution be-
tween Mexican and foreign brands of good j is σj = 1/
¡
1− ρj
¢
. Let pj and
p∗j be the border prices of Mexican and foreign goods respectively and qj and
q∗j their internal prices, the wedge between the two being an ad-valorem tariﬀ
at rate tj (the diﬀerence between MFN and NAFTA tariﬀs will be introduced
shortly). Thus, qj = (1 + tj) pj.
Define Qj ≡ q1−σjj +
¡
q
∗
j
¢1−σj . The US demand for the Mexican brand
of good j is then xj =
³
q−σjj /Qj
´
Ej where Ej = qjxj + q∗jx
∗
j is the sub-
expenditure on good j, and the own-price elasticity of US demand forMexican
final good j is εj = σj + (1− σj) q1−σjj /Qj. Similar expressions hold for the
foreign good.
Mexican goods are produced by combining value added withm intermedi-
ates indexed by i under a Leontief technology with input-output coeﬃcients
aij. Each intermediate can be sourced from either of two origins: US or
“foreign” (ROW). The two origins are perfect substitutes in the fabrication
of Mexican final goods.9 Let zij denote the quantity of “composite” (US and
foreign) intermediate i used in the production of j; that is, zij = zij + z∗ij.
Then
xj = min
½
Fj(Kj, Lj);
z1j
a1j
; ...;
zmj
amj
¾
.
9In the simulations below, this assumption, which is used here only for analytical
tractability, is replaced by the less restrictive Armington framework.
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In the absence of RoO, perfect substitutability means that Mexican choice of
intermediates (US vs. foreign) would be bang-bang. If US intermediates were
all more expensive than foreign ones, for instance, they would not be used at
all. However, with rules specifying a minimum content rj (expressed here for
simplicity as a proportion of total intermediate use), Mexican exporters have
to use US and foreign intermediates in proportions rj and 1−rj respectively.
LetCj (xj) be the cost function dual to Fj and φj (pj) ≡ Cj [xj (pj)] /xj (pj)
the corresponding unit-cost function, and suppose that φ0j > 0. If pi is the
price of US intermediate i and p∗i that of its foreign substitute, the marginal
cost of Mexican final good j is
Φj = φj +
mX
i=1
aij [rjpi + (1− rj) (1 + ti) p∗i ]
= φj +
mX
i=1
aijpi
where pi = rjpi + (1− rj) q∗i and q∗i = (1 + ti) p∗i . A similar expression holds
for the functional forms adopted in section 4, where a binding RoO raises
final-good unit costs.
Optimal pricing by Mexican final-good exporters impliesµ
1− 1
εj
¶
qj = (1 + tj)
Ã
φj +
mX
i=1
aij pi
!
. (1)
Because pi is an increasing function of rj whenever pi > q
∗
i , the supply
price of Mexican final goods in the US is itself an increasing function of the
local-content requirement rj.10 We now compute by how much.
2.3 Pass-through
2.3.1 Mexican
We start with Mexican pass-through, then use a slightly diﬀerent version
of the model to study US pass-through. Assume first that the price of US
intermediates is fixed. Let pNj and p
M
j stand for NAFTA and MFN producer
prices respectively and tNj and t
M
j for NAFTA and MFN tariﬀs. Let also
10If pi ≤ q∗i , the local-content requirement is not binding.
8
∆pj ≡ pNj − pMj and ∆tj ≡ tMj − tNj . Diﬀerentiating expression (1) and
linearizing, one can show (see appendix A.1) that
∆pj
pMj
' Ψj ∆tj
1 + tMj
+Θjrj (2)
whereΘj > 0 andΨj > 0 are expressions given in full in Appendix A1’s equa-
tions (14) and (15) respectively. The first term measures the pass-through
eﬀect resulting from preferential market access. The second term, which
depends on input-output relationships, the price of US intermediates, and
the elasticity of demand for the final Mexican good in the US, measures the
impact on Mexican border prices of intermediate-price increases “exported”
from the US and induced by RoO.
2.3.2 US
We now relax the assumption that the price of US intermediates is fixed and
consider the market for US intermediate i. Let zi (pi) be its US supply; if it
is exhausted by Mexican demand, the market-clearing condition is
nX
j=1
aijxj (pj) = zi (pi) (3)
Diﬀerentiating (3), rearranging and letting εsi and ε
s
j be the supply elas-
ticities of intermediate and final goods respectively, we have, after several
manipulations:
∆pi
pMi
' zi
p2i ε
s
i
nX
j=1
aijxjεsj
∆pj
pMj
, (4)
which is similar in form to (2) but depends on downstream final-good prices.
This raises an endogeneity issue with which we deal by instrumenting in both
equations.11
11As in (2), ∆pi/pMi depends on a weighted sum of ∆pj/pMj in which the weights are
the input-output coeﬃcients bij . In (2), ∆pj/pMj can be similarly shown to depend on
a weighted sum of ∆pi/pMi through Θj (see appendix A.1). Thus, the link between the
regressor and the error term in (2) is via two nested weighted sums and is thus, although
linear, very indirect.
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3 Estimation
3.1 Estimation equations
In (2), RoOs were taken to be all in the form of a regional value content. In
practice, however, they take diﬀerent forms which can be treated distinctly in
the estimation. We use dummy variables, each of which represents a specific
legal form of RoO. Thus, CCj is equal to one if a change of chapter on good
j is required;12 and TECHj is equal to one if a technical requirement is
imposed.13 The equation to be estimated for the Mexican pass-through is
thus
∆pj
pMj
= α0 + α1
∆tj
1 + tMj
+ α2CCj + α3TECHj + uj. (5)
All parameter estimates are expected to be positive.
For the US, the pass-through equation to be estimated is
∆pi
pMi
= β0 + β1
∆ti
1 + tMi
+ β2CCi + β3TECHi + β4
X
j
bij
∆tj¡
1 + tMj
¢
+β5
P
j
bijCCj + β6
P
j
bijTECHj + i. (6)
In words, the US pass-through of Mexican tariﬀ preferences, measured by
coeﬃcient β1, is estimated after controlling for two eﬀects relevant to the
determination of US intermediate prices. The first type of eﬀects, picked up
by coeﬃcients β2 and β3, is that of RoOs applying to US intermediates them-
selves. This did not appear in the algebra above where intermediates were
not themselves assumed to be produced with imported intermediates (in or-
der to avoid unnecessarily complicating the calculations). The second type of
eﬀects are demand ones measured by coeﬃcients β4 (eﬀect of downstream US
preferences on Mexican goods using intermediate i filtered by input-output
coeﬃcients aij) and β5 and β6 (same thing for downstream RoOs). Those
eﬀects instrument for the prices of downstream final goods, themselves en-
dogenous as argued above. Intuitively, a higher US preference on downstream
12The notation CCj stands for a change in tariﬀ chapter, a type of RoO requiring the
Mexican final product shipped to the US to be classified in a chapter of the Harmonized
System diﬀerent from its imported intermediates.
13The notation TECHj stands for a type of RoO imposing a technical requirement on
the final good’s production process.
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Mexican goods raises the induced demand for intermediates and hence their
price; stiﬀer RoOs downstream pick up the “captive-market” eﬀect discussed
in the introduction. Thus, all coeﬃcients are expected to be positive and the
null hypothesis on β5 and β6 is that there is no captive-market eﬀect.
We estimate (5) on panel data using the Weighted Least Squares (WLS)
estimator which performs better than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on our
sample because it modulates the importance of each observation in the final
solution (see appendix A.4 for details). This method assigns to each observa-
tion (tariﬀ line) a weight reflecting its importance in total Mexican exports
to the US (NAFTA and MFN regimes combined). In the same way, equation
(6) is estimated on cross-section data using the WLS estimator with a weight
reflecting the importance of each line in total US exports to Mexico.
3.2 Data
Unit values and tariﬀ preference margins are compiled at the HS-8 level from
U.S. Department of Commerce, Treasury, and International Trade Commis-
sion data as detailed in Appendices A.2 and A.3.14 For (5), the sample
includes all HS-8 lines of Section 11 (Textiles and Textile Articles as defined
in the HS Trade Classification–see appendix A.2) over 2000-2002. Are in-
cluded only tariﬀ lines with positive US imports of Mexican products and
strictly positive US imports fromMexico under NAFTA’s regime (that is, we
keep only those tariﬀ lines with positive rates of utilization (ujt) of NAFTA’s
preferential regime , since when ujt = 0 there is no rent to share).
Two methods are used to compute ∆pj/pMj , the dependent variable in
the estimation of the Mexican pass-through (5). The first method, called the
“Mexican method” because it compares the unit value of the same Mexican
good imported under NAFTA and under MFN, has the advantage of using
two unit values that are strictly comparable in the calculation but it reduces
14Unit values are calculated by dividing import values by volumes. This method yields
notoriously noisy proxies for the true prices at which goods are sold, as customs records
of physical volumes are typically less reliable than their records of values and both are
aﬀected by composition problems. Composition problems are somewhat mitigated at deep
levels of disaggregation, but then the quantities involved tend to be smaller and aberrant
numbers encountered more frequently. The HS-8 level is arguably the best compromise
in this regard. US tariﬀs are calculated by taking the ratio of collected duties to custom
value at the tariﬀ-line level in order to take into account any special sub-regime or partial
exemption.
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the size of the sample since it excludes tariﬀ lines with 100% utilization
rates, i.e. 48% of the observations. The second method, called the “ROW
method”, includes all observations but measures the relative price ∆pj/pMj
as the percentage diﬀerence between the border price (unit value) of a good
imported from Mexico under NAFTA and the border price of the “same”
good imported from all US import sources including Mexico under the MFN
regime. By contrast with the Mexican method, the ROWmethod introduces
some product heterogeneity.
The sample used for the estimation of (6) includes all intermediates used
in the manufacturing of Mexican T&A products for export to the US under
the same conditions as before, i.e. positive Mexican imports from US under
the NAFTA regime (i.e. positive imports and 0 < uj < 100%). Tariﬀ
preference is now computed on Mexico’s imports of US intermediate i, while
the RoO are the same as before (because the same rules apply to all of
NAFTA’s signatories). In addition to tariﬀ preferences and RoO on imports
of US intermediates i, the regression includes tariﬀ preferences and RoO on
downstream goods j weighted by input-output coeﬃcients bij.15 Tables 1 and
2 report descriptive statistics of the variables used in each equation, table 1
referring to variables in equation (5) and table 2 referring to variables in (6).
Tables 1 and 2 here
Regarding RoO together with bilateral cumulation,16 a change-of-chapter
(CC) implies that when non-originating (ROW) inputs are used, the trans-
formation performed in Mexico must be substantial enough for the final good
to belong to a chapter that is not identical to that of its non-originating com-
ponents. This implies an implicit regional value content applying to value
added and originating inputs, taken together, relative to the value of non-
originating inputs. Although more complicated than in the simple model
15Owing to lack of data, these “input-output” coeﬃcients are computed from the US
input-output table for the year 2000 converted from US IO codes (approx. 300 lines) to
the HS-8 level, the degree of disaggregation at which we measure unit values. “Blowing
up” of aggregate coeﬃcients into HS-8 disaggregation was done by attributing to each
HS-8 line a value of intermediate sales equal to the inverse of the number of HS-8 lines
falling in its US IO code category.
16Bilateral cumulation means that US inputs are counted as originating in the making
of Mexican final goods for re-export to the US, and vice versa.
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of section 2, this requirement has essentially the same eﬀect. As to techni-
cal requirements, Cadot et al (forthcoming) document how they tend to be
fine-tuned to suit special interests, with equivalent cost-raising eﬀects.
For each instrument used to confer origin (TECH or CC) the number
appearing in the table is the percentage of tariﬀ lines to which that instru-
ment applies. Under the Mexican method 92.4% of tariﬀ lines at the HS-8
level had to satisfy a change of classification at the chapter levels, and 65.6%
had technical requirements on the product or process. The proportion of
tariﬀ lines aﬀected by technical requirements strongly increases if the sample
is restricted to final goods (i.e. products at the last stage of production).
3.3 Results
Table 3a reports results of the Mexican pass-through estimates using the
Mexican method, and table 3b results using the ROW method. The first
set of estimates includes only the tariﬀ preference margin (and time eﬀects)
as explanatory variables. Coeﬃcients for the rate of tariﬀ preference are
always significant at the 5% level and robust to the choice of method: these
estimates suggest that Mexican producers retain about 80% of the preference
margin. The null hypothesis of no pass-through (no change in consumer
price, i.e. border-price increase equal to 100% of the tariﬀ preference) cannot
be rejected at the 5% level. Taken at face value, these estimates would
suggest that Mexican producers did retain a fairly large proportion of the
rents created by trade preference.
Table 3 here
However, when dummy variables measuring the presence of RoO are in-
cluded, the picture changes. Part of border-price increase now compensates
Mexican producers for the cost of complying with NAFTA’s RoO, whose
coeﬃcients are both positive, significant, and quantitatively large.17 The
coeﬃcient on the tariﬀ preference having gone down from 0.784 to 0.501,
17Because RoO are proxied by dummy variables and the dependent variable is mea-
sured in percentage points, the coeﬃcients give the estimated price increase, measured in
percentage points, attributable to the presence of RoOs.
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Mexican producers now retain only about half of the tariﬀ preference mar-
gin. This suggests that previous estimates of the share of rents retained by
producers were significantly overestimated.
The coeﬃcients on RoO variables also suggest that these requirements
have a significant eﬀect on price and therefore –presumably– on production
costs. This is consistent with the results of Carrère and de Melo (2004) on
the relative costs of various types of RoO. In accordance with intuition, the
fourth column of results in Tables 3a and 3b shows that the eﬀect of RoO is
also stronger and more precisely estimated when the sample is restricted to
final goods (as defined in the BEC classification).
If such a significant chunk of the preferences granted to Mexican pro-
ducers are flushed, where do they go? On one hand, RoO may well be
dissipative barriers (like discriminatory product standards), raising produc-
tion costs without directly creating oﬀsetting rents elsewhere. On the other
hand, they may also generate rents upstream in the value chain. In order to
explore the latter hypothesis, we now turn to an analysis of the pass-through
of Mexican preferences by US exporters of intermediate goods.
Results for the US pass-through equation are shown in Table 4. The first
two columns show the results of an estimation carried out over the whole
sample, while the last two show the results of the same estimation but carried
out on a sample restricted to the BEC’s definition of intermediate goods.
Table 4
Mexico’s tariﬀ preference has a highly significant and quantitatively large
eﬀect, with a pass-through of only 38% over the whole sample and no pass-
through at all when the sample is restricted to intermediate goods. This
suggests that US intermediate-good suppliers may have substantial market
power relative to Mexican final-good assemblers.
The eﬀect of RoO on the price of US exports to Mexico is not significant,
suggesting, in accordance with intuition, that RoO aﬀect final-assemblers lo-
cated in Mexico more than intermediate-good producers located in the US.
By contrast, US tariﬀ preferences on downstream final goods have a large and
significant eﬀect on the price of US intermediates used in the fabrication of
those goods. The strength of the eﬀect (with a pass-through of only 31-36%)
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is indeed a surprise given how imperfectly measured are the input-output
linkages. More importantly for us, RoO downstream matter, although their
eﬀect is (unsurprisingly given that the eﬀect is filtered by input-output coef-
ficients) quantitatively small. For the whole sample, changes of chapter and
technical requirements are statistically significant; for intermediate goods,
only technical requirements are significant, confirming anecdotal evidence
that technical requirements are often manipulated by upstream interests to
distort the input choices of downstream industries.18
It may be tempting to interpret the negative constant as evidence of
strategic price cuts in response to a decrease in the prices charged by either
US producers or non-preferred ones, as documented by Winters and Chang
(2000) in the context of Spain’s accession to the EU and by Chang and
Winters (2002) in the context of Mercosur. However this interpretation of
the constant would be dubious in our context: strategic price cuts ought to
be systematically related to the depth of tariﬀ preferences and hence should
not be picked up by the constant.
4 NAFTA’s Welfare Eﬀects in T&A: Simula-
tions
The above results suggest a changing pattern of trade in the T&A sector
with much erosion of preferences via the restrictiveness of RoO and increases
in the prices of US textile intermediates sold to the Mexican apparel sector.
Such price developments would be consistent with rather small shifts in sales
of apparel towards the US and rather larger shifts in intermediate purchase
sales by Mexican apparel producers towards the US. This reorientation of
trade is confirmed by the indicators in Table 5a. NAFTA resulted in a
sharp re-orientation of intermediate (textiles) export sales by the US towards
Mexico, the RZ indicator increasing by 24%, while there was negligible re-
orientation of final goods sales by Mexicans to the US, the RF indicator
only increasing by 2%. Table 5a also gives an indicator of the extent of
18Brenton and Imagawa (forthcoming) note the particularly egregious case of a NAFTA
RoO for certain clothing products specifying that imported fabric must be “of subheading
511111 or 511119, if hand-woven, with a loom width of less than 76cm, woven in the United
Kingdom in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Harris Tweed Association,
Ltd, and so certified by the Association.” (p. 20)
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vertical trade, V , the ratio of specialization in intermediate purchases in
the US over final sales to the US. The increase in the value of V indicates
that NAFTA has been accompanied by a pattern of ‘vertical exchange’ of
the oﬀshore assembly type whereby the US ships semi-finished goods for
assembly in Mexico and then re-imports them as finished products. Taken
together, these quantity developments suggest little Mexican access to the
US market and a verticalization of the pattern of Mexican-US trade.
Table 5 here
How costly were the RoO for Mexican T&A exporters? To get orders
of magnitude, we carry out simulations with the partial equilibrium struc-
tural model (details in Appendix A.5.) inspired from the model presented
in section 2 to attempt to capture the costs of RoO for Mexican exporters
of apparel products. Suppose then that Mexican apparel producers sell all
their output abroad, either to the US, XUS under NAFTA, or to the ROW,
XROW , and that they purchase all their intermediates abroad, either from
the US, ZUS, or again from the ROW, ZROW under a Leontief technology
linking value-added and aggregate intermediate demand, aZ . Assume an up-
ward sloping supply curve for value-added in the Mexican T&A industry and
let εX be the corresponding elasticity of supply (assumed constant). Let also
PUSX be unit producer price of Mexican apparel exported to the US market,
PV A the price of value added, CRZ the restricted unit costs under binding
RoO, and λ be the administrative cost component assumed to be fixed per
unity. To simplify the interpretation of results, Mexican apparel producers
are assumed to be price-takers in the markets for intermediate textiles and
sell apparel to the ROW at a constant price, but not for sales to the US (see
below).
For a small NAFTA preference margin τ > 0, the percentage increase
in producer surplus from preferential market access, cW (here equal to the
welfare benefit under the assumption of no domestic demand) is:
cW = (1 + dPV A)1+εX − 1 ≈ (1 + εX)dPV A (7)
Nothing prevents cW from being negative, in which case Mexican apparel
producers would not export under the NAFTA regime.
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As in Section 2, the distortionary cost of RoO is black-boxed through a
regional value content (RVC) equivalent.19 If subscript zero denotes profit-
maximizing per-unit use of US intermediates prior to NAFTA (say the ratio
given in table 5), and subscript one the corresponding use by the representa-
tive competitive Mexican firm when it faces a binding RoO and preferential
access, we have on the cost side
zR ≡ ZUS1 /ZROW1 > z0 ≡ ZUS0 /ZROW0 (8)
giving the following restricted cost function for intermediates:
CRZ = P
R
Z (z
R, PROWz ;σ) (9)
where PROWz is the (exogenous) price of intermediates purchased outside of
NAFTA and σ is the elasticity of substitution in use between intermediates
of diﬀerent origin. Thus: CRZ > CZ in the presence of RoO, and (7) captures
the distortionary costs associated with RoO.
Equilibrium in the US market for Mexican apparel requires US demand
for Mexican goods, QMexUS , to equal Mexican supply to the US, X
US, as re-
flected in (10). NAFTA has two eﬀects. On the demand side, the preference
margin, τ , reduces the consumer price of Mexican apparel,PMexQ , sold in the
US.On the supply side, RoO (r, λ) raises the unit cost of sales to the US,
PUSX (r, λ). Equilibrium under NAFTA in the Mexican apparel industry is
achieved by adjustment of the unit price of Mexican apparel exports to the
US, PMexQ = P
US
X . One can then write the reduced-form expression corre-
sponding to the underlying structural model (see appendix A5) for equilib-
rium in theMexican apparel sector in terms of demand and supply elasticities,
and share parameters describing the sector prior to the implementation of
NAFTA, i.e. as:
QUSMex
£
PMexQ (τ); ε, σQ
¤
= XUS
£
PUSX (r, λ); εX , aZ , θ, σ
¤
(10)
19As shown in the bottom of Table 5, there is actually no RVC in the T&A sector, the
most common RoOs requiring changes of tariﬀ classification. Exceptions and technical
requirements also apply to 99% and 47% of T&A tariﬀ lines respectively. Given the large
increase in Mexican intermediate purchases from the US following NAFTA, it can be safely
assumed that these requirements were designed to raise the RVC of Mexican production.
The essays collected in Cadot et al. (forthcoming) document how NAFTA’s exceptions
and technical requirements have been calibrated to make US sourcing the only option.
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Table 6 describes the results of illustrative simulations with calibration
inspired from the pre-NAFTA shares and tariﬀs given in table 5. Initially,
Mexican apparel producers face a 10% MFN tariﬀ in the US market, and the
share of intermediates textiles imports from the US is equal to 30%. Unless
otherwise indicated, all demand and supply elasticities are assumed equal to
unity, and the US share of Mexican apparel exports is 50%. All simulations
assume a preferential market access of τ = 10% in the US market for apparel
imports. If this preferential access was not accompanied by RoO, export
supply to the US market would increase by 5.4% with unit costs increasing
by 0.6% because of the assumption of upward-sloping resource costs for the
apparel industry. Mexican welfare would increase by 6.6% (base in column
1). Granting preferential access to Mexican apparel suppliers lowers the price
paid by US consumers ( bPMexQ < 0), with a pass-through of approximately
50%.20
Table 6 here
Imposing RoO equivalent to raising US intermediate demand by 15 per-
centage points reduces supply response as unit costs are raised by 4 percent-
age points and welfare gains are cut by 3.5 percentage points (simulation
1). Adding administrative costs of 3 percent reduces the decline in price of
Mexican apparel in the US market (not shown), cutting export expansion in
half (with a secondary eﬀect of a lower increase in unit export price to the
US). Profits are now less than 0.9% (simulation 2). Selling under NAFTA is
now barely profitable21.
The sensitivity of these results to initial shares are explored in the last
three simulations in table 6. Each simulation assumes the same preferential
20Equivalently, preferential market access, raises the unit price received by Mexican
apparel producers when they sell in the US market under NAFTA ( bPUSX > 0)
21Alternatively, doubling the intermediate input requirements from the US (without
adding administrative costs) will yield negative profits and therefore it will make exporting
under NAFTA a more costly proposition than exporting under MFN (not shown in table
6). This may well be the situation facing many T&A producers entering preferential
agreeements with a Northern partner as they depend substantially on imported inputs,
and often have small shares in the Northern partner’s market as they face competition
from competitors.
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access, no administrative costs and the same increase in the share of US
intermediates of 15 percentage points (as in simulations 1 and 2). One can
check that simultaneously increasing value-added (i.e. lowering intermediate
purchases by half) and raising the US share of export share by 20 percentage
points yields the same welfare gain as in the base simulation (simulation
3), whereas lowering the initial US export share, reduces the gains from
preferential access (simulation 5).
As a final exercise, noting that in spite of rather substantial market access
in the T&A sector, NAFTA utilization rates are less than 100% (see table 5b),
we solve the model for cW = 0 in (7) under diﬀerent stringency requirements
for establishing origin (here captured by increasing RVC ratios). In this
exercise, we compute the rate of preferential market access, τ(= tm − tn)
which would leave Mexican apparel producers indiﬀerent between selling in
the US under the NAFTA and MFN regimes using the share values used in
simulations 1 to 3 in table 6. The results are displayed in figure 1 which
traces the combinations of RoO (measured as departures from an initial US
intermediate share of 30%) on the horizontal axis and preference rates on the
vertical axis.
Figure 1 here
According to the illustrative estimates in figure 1, with an elasticity of
substitution of σ = 1 in use between US and ROW intermediates, an increase
in the US intermediate share of textiles from 30% to 45% (in the ballpark
of estimates in table 5a) and no administrative costs (i.e. λ = 0 in (7)), a
preferential market access of 7% percent would be required to leave Mexican
apparel producers indiﬀerent, i.e. on their ‘participation constraint’ to the
NAFTA regime. These eﬀects would be compounded if we were to include
in the simulations a rising price for US intermediates as suggested by the
econometric results in section 322. If one views technical requirements and
22For instance, assuming an elasticity of supply of US intermediates to Mexico equal
to three (six), the required preferential access would have to increase from 7% to 14%
(10%). The restrictiveness of RVC is evident ,since an increase in the US intermediates
share of textiles from 30% to 35% would require a preferential access of 3% in order to
leave Mexican producers in their participation constraint (assuming an elasticity of supply
of US intermediates to Mexico equal to three).
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exceptions as equivalent to reducing the value of σ, it is likely that market
access was, in eﬀect, quite low under NAFTA. For example with σ = 0.5, a
plausible elasticity of substitution for intermediates purchases, a preference
rate of about τ = 10% would be needed to give a marginal preferential access
to Mexican apparel producers.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied Mexican market access to the US market under
NAFTA in the Textile and Apparel (T&A) sector. We have shown that
only about half of the tariﬀ preference (of about 10%) was retained by Mex-
ican producers. Furthermore, taken together, our estimates suggest that
NAFTA’s tariﬀ preference might just about compensate Mexican producers
for the cost of complying with rules of origin. As a result, eﬀective market
access for Mexican T&A producers would have been largely unchanged under
NAFTA.
We also find that the induced upstream eﬀect on the price of US interme-
diate (textile) goods used in the production of Mexican final (apparel) goods
is significant and rather large. The price of US intermediates sold to Mexico
are, on average, higher than the prices of the same goods for export to other
(non preferential) destination by 12-13%. Technical requirements (a partic-
ular form of RoOs that is prevalent in the T&A sector) just by themselves
account for a full third of that price increase, or about 4 percentage points,
a strong signal in noisy data.
Inspired by these estimates, we carried out simulations in a stripped down
model of the Mexican T&A sector in which Mexican apparel producers can
sell either to the ROW of the US under NAFTA, but under the condition
that they increase their purchases of US textile intermediates. Simulation
results confirm that preferential margins of the magnitude granted under
NAFTAmight have been just about suﬃcient to compensateMexican apparel
producers for having to increase their purchases of US textiles.
These results inform the debate on the usefulness of trade preferences as
a development tool. Given that preference margins are bounded above by
the level of MFN tariﬀs which are, for industrial countries, at fairly low levels
(apparel examined here is among the few exceptions), preferences absorbed
in half by a combination of higher costs and pass-through to buyers are likely
20
to be of limited value to Southern partners. Taken together, our results lend
credence to the suspicion that rules of origin are not so much a development-
policy tool designed to prevent screwdriver assembly (a potentially worthy
objective) but instead a circuitous way of raising the profits of upstream pro-
ducers by creating a captive market for them in partner countries. This is
likely to be an especially important issue in North-South preferential agree-
ments where vertical trade (capital-intensive component manufacturing in
the North, labor-intensive assembly in the South) is prevalent. The flurry
of regional trade agreements may well be a costly diversion distracting from
necessary reforms to improve the functioning of the World Trading System.
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Tables
Table 1
Descriptive statistics, Mexican pass-through
“Mexican method” “ROW method”
good j All Only Final All Only Final
obs. 1304 913 2497 1324
ujt a) (%) 73.24 69.58 75.68 71.78
∆pjt
pMjt
a) (%) 4.58 4.87 3.99 4.55
∆tjt
1+tMjt
a) (%) 6.07 5.87 6.22 5.79
CCj b) (%) 91.87 92.36 82.66 92.56
TECHj b) (%) 65.57 80.36 48.34 88.60
Interm. (%) 29.98 - 46.98 -
Final (%) 70.02 - 53.02 -
Notes
Sample period: 2000-2002.
Sample data: Textile & Apparel sector (HS-8 section 11).
a) weighted averages (reflecting the importance of each tariﬀ line j in total Mexican
exports to the US).
b) % of HS-8 level tariﬀ lines.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics, US pass-through
Good i All (intermed.& Final) Only Intermed.
Observations 837 473
∆pi/p
M
i a/ (%) 12.16 13.33
∆ti/
¡
1 + tMi
¢
a/ (%) 12.32 13.76
CCi b/ (%) 82.32 68.92
TECHi b/ (%) 42.29 7.61P
j aij∆tj/
¡
1 + tMj
¢
a/ (%) 5.71 5.72P
j aijCCj a/ (%) 34.01 42.33P
j aijTECHj a/ (%) 68.80 67.24
Notes
Sample period: 2000.
Sample data: Textile & Apparel sector (HS-8 section 11).
a/ Weighted averages (reflecting the share of each US intermediate sales of line i to
Mexican T&A sector).
b/ Percentage of HS-8 tariﬀ lines.
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Table 3
Regression results, Mexican pass-through
Table 3a: Mexican Method
∆pjt
pMjt
All Only Final All Only Final
Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat
∆tjt
1+tMjt
0.784** 3.29 0.799** 3.33 0.501** 2.98 0.474** 3.04
CCj - - - - 0.998* 1.97 1.054** 2.73
TECHj - - - - 1.674** 3.75 1.989** 4.51
obs. 1304 913 1304 913
R2-adj. 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.56
Table 3b: ROW Method
∆pjt
pMjt
All Only Final All Only Final
Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat
∆tjt
1+tMjt
0.794** 3.23 0.739** 3.15 0.503** 2.89 0.410** 2.97
CCj - - - - 0.756** 2.63 0.967** 3.24
TECHj - - - - 2.045** 3.11 1.982** 4.08
obs. 2497 1324 2497 1324
R2-adj. 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.54
Notes
** and * indicates estimates significant at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
t-statistics next to coeﬃcients.
Constant and time eﬀects are included but not reported.
Sample period: 2000-2002.
Sample data: Textile & Apparel sector (HS section 11).
Estimator: Weighted Least Squares.
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Table 4
Regression results, US pass-through
∆pi
pMi
All (intermed. & final) Only Intermed.
Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat
∆ti
1+tMi
0.620** 6.54 0.928** 6.76
CCi -1.516 -1.31 1.405 0.72
TECH i 2.319 1.11 1.983 1.51P
j aij
∆tj
1+tMj
0.689** 3.86 0.637** 2.07P
j aijCCj 0.037* 1.86 0.022 0.54P
j aijTECHj 0.053** 2.01 0.119** 2.39
Cst -3.848 -1.47 -9.898** -2.28
obs. 837 473
R2-adj. 0.54 0.51
Notes
** and * indicate estimates significant at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
t-statistics next to coeﬃcients.
Sample period: 2000.
Sample data: Textile & Apparel sector (HS section 11).
Estimator: Weighted Least Squares.
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Table 5
Trade and preferences, and RoO in Mexican-US T&A trade
Table 5a: Changing patterns of Mexican-US trade in T&A
Post-NAFTA/Pre-NAFTAa)
Mex. imports (interm.) RZ= ZUS/ZROW 1.24
Mex exports (final) RF= XUS/XROW 1.02
Verticalization index V = RZ/RF 1.22
Table 5b: Preferences and RoO in T&A b)
All Intm. Final
US Tariﬀ pref. (unweighted) 10.09% 9.97% 10.21%
RoO (% of tariﬀ lines)
Exceptions 99.3 99.2 99.3
Technical requirements 47.6 2.6 88.3
Utilization rates 86.09% 96.31% 76.85%
Notes: All figures are trade figures summed over the relevant product categories ac-
cording to the BEC classification of activities.
ZUS, [ZROW ]: Intermediate purchases from US [ROW]
XUS, [XROW ]: Export sales of apparel to US [ROW]
a) Column values are ration of two year averages (2000-1998) and (1994-1992).
b) The sample includes all HS-8 tariﬀ lines of Section 11 with positive US imports of
Mexican products and strictly positive US imports from Mexico under NAFTA’s regime
(that is only those tariﬀ lines with positive rates of utilization, see section 3.2) in 2000,
i.e. 828 tariﬀ lines.
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Table 6
Simulation results
Base simul 1 simul 2
Initial Shares
RV C0 → RV C1 1 35→351 35→50 35→50
INTR = eZ/X 2 40 40 40
ES0 3 50 50 50
λ (%) 4 0 0 3
RESULTS2bPUSX 5 4.3 5.5 4.3bXUS 6 5.4 4.2 2.6cCZ (cCRZ ) 7 0.6 4.7 4.7cW 8 6.6 3.1 0.9
simul 3 simul 4 simul 5
Initial Shares
RV C0 → RV C1 1 35→50 35→50 35→50
INTR = eZ/X 2 20 20 70
ES0 3 70 30 70
λ (%) 4 0 0 0
RESULTSbPUSX 5 5.0 5.3 5.7bXUS 6 4.7 4.5 4.1cCZ (cCRZ ) 7 4.7 4.7 4.7cW 8 6.6 1.7 5.0
Notes and definition of variables::
RV C0 = (ZUS/(ZUS + ZROW ))0 = 0.35;ES0 = (XUS/(XUS +XROW ));
λ =administrative costs; cW = (1 + dPV A)1+εX − 1 ≈ (1 + εX)dPV A
All simulations, assume τ ≡ (tM − tN)/(1 + tM)= 10%; ε = 1, εQ = 1, σz =
1, σQ = 1, Ω = 1, tmZ = tmZ = 0
1 In the base simulation there is no RVC restriction.
2 Let hats denote a proportional increase in the variables.
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Figure 1: Participation constraint
change in the elasticity of substitution of intermediates (sigmaZ )
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Appendices23
Appendix A.1 Derivation of expressions in section 2
Derivation of expression (2)
Diﬀerentiating expression (1) givesµ
1− 1
εj
¶
dqj = (1 + tj)
"
φ0jdpj +
mX
i=1
aij∆pidrj
#
+
"
φj +
mX
i=1
aijpi
#
dtj.
(11)
where ∆pi = pi − (1 + ti)p∗i
As qj = (1 + tj) pj, it follows that
dqj = (1 + tj) dpj + pjdtj. (12)
Substituting (12) into (11) givesµ
1− 1
εj
¶
[(1 + tj) dpj + pjdtj] = (1 + tj)φ
0
jdpj+(1 + tj)
mX
i=1
aij∆pidrj+
Ã
φj +
mX
i=1
aijpi
!
dtj,
orµ
1− 1
εj
− φ0j
¶
dpj =
mX
i=1
aij∆pidrj+
1
1 + tj
"
φj +
mX
i=1
aijpi −
µ
1− 1
εj
¶
pj
#
dtj
Rearranging slightly, this gives
dpj =
Pm
i=1 aij∆pi³
1− 1
εj
− φ0j
´ drj +


φj +
Pm
i=1 aijpi −
³
1− 1
εj
´
pj³
1− 1
εj
− φ0j
´
(1 + tj)

 dtj.
In discrete form, we have thus
∆pj
pj
'
Pm
i=1 aij∆pi³
1− 1
εj
− φ0j
´
pj
∆rj
+


φj +
Pm
i=1 aijpi −
³
1− 1
εj
´
pj³
1− 1
εj
− φ0j
´
pj

 ∆tj
(1 + tj)
. (13)
23Not submitted for publication.
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Suppose that expression (13) is evaluated around MFN prices. Let pNj and
pMj stand for NAFTA and MFN producer prices respectively and t
N
j and t
M
j
for NAFTA and MFN tariﬀs. The regional value content rj is zero under
the MFN regime, so we have, after switching the bracketed term’s sign, one
obtains
pNj − pMj
pMj
'
Pm
i=1 aij∆pi³
1− 1
εj
− φ0j
´
pMj
rj
+


³
1− 1
εj
´
pMj − φj −
Pm
i=1 aijpi³
1− 1
εj
− φ0j
´
pMj

 t
M
j − tNj
tMj
which is expression (2) in the text with
Θj =
Pm
i=1 aij∆pi³
1− 1
εj
− φ0j
´
pMj
(14)
and
Ψj =
³
1− 1
εj
´
pMj − φj −
Pm
i=1 aijpi³
1− 1
εj
− φ0j
´
pMj
. (15)
Appendix A.2. HS Trade Classification- Section XI
50 Silk
51 Wool. Fine Or Coarse Animal Hair; Horsehair Yarn and Woven Fabric
52 Cotton
53 Other Vegetable Textile Fibres; Paper Yarn and Woven Fabrics of Paper
Yarn
54 Man-made Filaments
55 Man-made Staple Fibres
56 Wadding. Felt and Nonwovens; Special Yarns; Twine. Cordage. Ropes
and Cables and Articles Thereof
57 Carpets and Other Textile Floor Coverings
58 Special Woven Fabrics; Tufted Textile Fabrics; Lace; Tapestries;
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Trimmings; Embroidery
59 Impregnated. Coated. Covered Or Laminated Textile Fabrics.
Textiles Articles Of a Kind Suitable for Industrial Use
60 Knitted Or Crocheted Fabrics
61 Articles of Apparel and Clothing Accessories. Knitted Or Crocheted
62 Articles of Apparel and Clothing Accessories. Not Knitted Or Crocheted
63 Other Made Up Textile Articles; Sets; Worn Clothing and Worn
Textile Articles; Rags
Appendix A.3. Variables
Variable definitions
uit : utilization rate, defined as the ratio of US imports from Mexico under US-
NAFTA preferential tariﬀs to total US imports from Mexico (including other pro-
grams) at the HS-8 level.
∆pjt
pMjt
: Mexican exporter price variation, defined as ∆pjt
pMjt
=
pNjt−pMjt
pMjt
with pNjt
(pMjt ) the NAFTA (MFN) pre-tariﬀ prices paid by the US to Mexican exporters of
j in year t.
∆tjt
1+tMjt
: Mexican tariﬀ preference margin, defined as ∆tjt
1+tMjt
=
tMjt−tNjt
1+tNjt
with tNjt
and tMjt the ad-valorem tariﬀs applied at the US border to Mexican goods under
the NAFTA and MFN regimes respectively.
∆pi
pMi
: US exporter price variation, defined as ∆pi
pMi
=
pNi −pMi
pMi
with pNi the NAFTA
pre-tariﬀ prices paid by the Mexican on US exports of i and pMi the MFN pre-tariﬀ
prices paid by the RoW on US exports of i;-both defined at the HTS-8 level.
∆ti
1+tMi
: US tariﬀ preference margin, defined as ∆ti
1+tMi
=
tMi −tNi
1+tNi
with tNi (t
M
i ) the
ad-valorem tariﬀs applied at the Mexican border to US (ROW) goods i under the
NAFTA (MFN) regimes-defined at the HTS-8 level;
CCi(j) : Dummy equal to 1 if a change of chapter on good i(j)-defined at the
HTS-6 level- is required, otherwise 0;24
24Change in tariﬀ classification, requiring the product to change its heading under the
Harmonized Commodity Description System in the originating country.
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TECHi(j) : Dummy equal to 1 if a technical requirement on good i(j) -defined
at the HTS-6 level- exists , otherwise 0;25
aij : Share of intermediate good i imported from US used by Mexican producer
of good j over total intermediate use of good i in 2000-defined at the HTS-8 level.;
δt : time (year) fixed eﬀects
Variables relative to the stage of production26: Interm. (Final)= Dummy equal
to 1 if the product is an intermediate (final) good, otherwise 0.
Details on Variable Computation
Variables ∆pjt
pMjt
, ∆pi
pMi
, ∆tjt
1+tMjt
, ∆ti
1+tMi
and uit have been compiled from tariﬀ and trade
data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Treasury, and the U.S.
International Trade Commission (http://www.dataweb.usitc.gov/)
pNjt (p
M
jt ): Unit prices of US imports from Mexico under NAFTA (MFN),
calculated as the ratio of customs value to number of units of category k in year t.
Note that customs value is the value of imports as appraised by the U.S. Customs
Service in current dollars and is defined as the price actually paid or payable for
merchandise, excluding U.S. import duties, freight, insurance, and other charges.
pNi (p
M
i ): Unit prices of US exports to Mexico (the rest of the World) under
NAFTA (MFN), calculated as the ratio of customs value to number of units of
category k in year t. Note that total export value are the total f.a.s. (free alongside
ship) value, i.e. the value of exports at the U.S. port, based on the transaction
price, including inland freight, insurance, and other charges incurred. The value
excludes the cost of loading the merchandise and also excludes any further costs.
tNjt (t
M
jt ): represent the NAFTA preferential (MFN) tariﬀ imposed by the US
on Mexican exports of j in year t, calculated as the ratio of collected duties to
custom value on US imports from Mexico under NAFTA (MFN). Calculated duty
represents the estimated import duties collected in actual Dollar, based on the
applicable rate(s) of duty as shown in the Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule (HTS).
tNit (t
M
it ): represents the oﬃcial NAFTA (MFN) preferential tariﬀ imposed by
the Mexican on imports of good i from the US (rest of the world).
25Technical requirement prescribing that the product must undergo specific manufac-
turing processing operations in the originating country.
26According to the BEC classification of goods and services.
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Appendix A.4. Weighted Linear Least Squares
With an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) specification, it is assumed that the data is
of “equal quality”, i.e. has constant variance. If this assumption is violated, the fit
may be unduly influenced by data of poor quality. In our sample, we can suspect
a problem of heteroskedasticity in the error term due to the presence of numerous
data outliers. This is confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test: the
null hypothesis of constant variance is rejected if equation (5) is estimated with
the OLS estimator. Figure 2, which plots the residuals shows that: (i) residual
variances indeed are not constant, and: (ii) residuals seem to be a function of the
tariﬀ line’s share in total Mexican exports to the US. The plot of residuals has
a funnel shape where “small lines” (those having a small share in total Mexican
exports to the US) yield more scattered response values than large lines. Under
those conditions weighted least squares regression improves the fit by including a
scale factor (the line’s weight in total Mexican exports to the US) in the fitting
process. Weighted least squares regression minimizes the error estimate
S =
nX
j=1
wjt(
∆pjt
pMjt
−
d∆pjt
pMjt
)2 (16)
where wjt are the weights. Hence, the weights determine how much each HTS-
8 line influences the final parameter estimates. A high-quality data point (i.e.
with a high share in total Mexican exports to US) influences the fit more than a
low-quality data point.
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Figure 2: Residuals in the unweighted model (Zoom)
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Appendix A.5. Simulation model for Welfare Analysis
This annex details the equations of the model used for the simulations re-
ported in section 6. The model is partial equilibrium with the size of the
industry proxied by the supply elasticity of factors entering in a stylized
T&A sector. Supply and demand decisions come from profit-maximisation
Mexican producers and expenditure cost minimization by a representative
US consumer. The tractability of this stylized T&A sector is obtained as
follows.
Strong separability is assumed at all production stages and for demand,
thereby reducing the number of parameters needed to simulate the model
by restraining cross-price eﬀects. On the US import side, strong separability
(or Armington assumption) implies two-stage budgeting so that the demand
for Mexican apparel only depends on the relative of price of Mexican ap-
parel in the US, i.e. the preferential rate received by Mexican producers,
τ , with σQ measuring the (Hicksian) price elasticity of demand. The same
strong separability assumption characterizes the export supply decision by
Mexican producers for sales to the US and to the ROW, with Ω, measuring
the (output-compensated) export price supply elasticity. Likewise, Mexican
producers’ decision for intermediate input purchases between the US and the
ROW is characterized by a constant (Hicksian) price elasticity of demand of
σ. As shown below, strong separability reduces the simulation estimates of
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preferential market access to the following five elasticities: εX , ε, σQ, Ω, σ.
Mexico produces a final good (call it apparel), X , with intermediates,
Z, according to a Leontief technology and an elasticity of supply of εX (A1
and A2). This final product, apparel, can be sold either to the US, XUS or
to the rest of the world, XROW at increasing marginal costs according to a
CET allocation function (the assumption is that there is some diﬀerentiation
in export sales across markets).This is reflected in (A3) and (A4). Unit price
for sales is given by the cost function associated with the CET function (A5).
Mexican apparel is produced with intermediate textile products,Z, which for
simplicity are not assumed to be produced domestically, but can be purchased
either from the US, ZUS, or from the rest-of-the-world (ROW), ZROW , inter-
mediates being imperfect substitutes by country of origin ((A6) and (A7)).
Cost minimization in the absence of restrictions yields intermediate demands
by country of origin (A8a) and corresponding unit costs (A9a).
Since we are not interested in the US side of NAFTA, we only model
the import demand decision. On the US side, a constant (price) elasticity
of demand, ε, describes the US demand for apparel, Q, with the demand by
country of origin depending on relative prices ( A10) as in the quasi-linear
utility function used in section 2. Thus the demand for Mexican apparel,
QMexUS , is an imperfect substitute with apparel products sold into the US under
MFN from the rest-of-the-world, QROWUS (A11) and (A12) with unit price for
US apparel purchases given by (A13). Except for sensitivity analysis, we
assume that Mexican apparel producers can purchase textiles from the US
at constant prices (A17).
To simplify, it is assumed that the US can purchase apparel from the ROW
at constant prices (A14) while the price paid for Mexican apparel depends on
Mexican cost conditions (A15) including fixed administrative costs, λ, when
RoO are binding (see below). Mexicans purchase intermediates at constant
prices from both sources (A16 and A17).
RoO are modelled as in section 2 by supposing that they are equivalent
to a regional value content scheme. Mexican producers of apparel must
purchase US inputs according to (A8b) instead of (A8a). Mexican producers
may also face fixed administrative costs per unit, λ. As a result, unit costs
of production are raised from CZ in (A9a) to CRZ in (A9b).
Under this set-up, an equilibrium in the Mexican market for apparel pro-
duction requires that US demand, QMexUS equal Mexican supply to the US,
XUS, as reflected in (A18). Implementing NAFTA has two eﬀects. On the
demand side, the preference margin, τ , raises the price received by Mexican
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suppliers of apparel,PMexQ .On the supply side, RoO forcing Mexican apparel
producers to use US intermediates raises the unit cost of sales to the US,
PUSX (r, λ). Equilibrium under NAFTA in the Mexican apparel industry is
achieved by adjustment in the unit price of Mexican apparel exports to the
US, PMexQ = P
US
X . One can then write the reduced form expression for equi-
librium in the Mexican apparel sector in terms of demand, supply elasticities
and share parameters describing the sector prior to the implementation of
NAFTA, i.e. as:
QUSMex(P
Mex
Q (τ); ε, σQ) = X
US(PUSX (r, λ)); εX , aZ , θ, σ)
Mexico
Mexican final good supply
X = AX (PV A)
εX (A1)
Value-added unit price
PV A = PX − aZCZ (A2)
Mexican export good allocation
XROW =
µ
X
γ
¶µ
1
α
¶ ΩΩ+1 "
1 +
µ
α
1− α
¶Ωµ PUSX
PROWX
¶Ω+1#− ΩΩ+1
(A3)
XUS =
µ
X
γ
¶µ
1
1− α
¶ ΩΩ+1 "
1 +
µ
1− α
α
¶ΩµPROWX
PUSX
¶Ω+1#− ΩΩ+1
(A4)
Unit price of composite export good
PX =
1
γ
h
α−Ω
¡
PROWX
¢1+Ω
+ (1− α)−Ω
¡
PUSX
¢1+Ωi 1Ω+1
(A5)
Demand for (imported) intermediates
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eZ = aZX (A6)
Demand for intermediates by country of origin
eZ = φ hβ (Z∗)σ−1σ + (1− β) ¡ZUS¢σ−1σ i σσ−1 (A7)
(Unconstrained) Intermediate demand by country of origin
ZUS
ZROW
=
·µ
1− β
β
¶ µ
PROWZ
PUSZ
¶¸σ
(A8a)
(Unconstrained) unit cost for intermediates
CZ =
1
φ
h
(β)σ
¡
PROWZ
¢1−σ
+ (1− β)σ
¡
PUSZ
¢1−σi 11−σ
(A9a)
US
Demand for textiles
QUS = AQ
¡
PUSQ
¢−ε
(A10)
QUS = ψ
·
θ (Q∗US)
σQ−1
σQ + (1− θ)
¡
QMexUS
¢σQ−1
σQ
¸σQ−1σQ
(A11)
QMexUS
QROWUS
=
"µ
1− θ
θ
¶ Ã
PROWQ
PMexQ
!#σQ
(A12)
Unit-price of composite imported good
PUSQ =
1
ψ
h
(θ)σQ
¡
PROWQ
¢1−σQ + (1− θ)σQ ¡PMexQ ¢1−σQi
1
1−σQ
(A13)
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Price relationships
Final goods
PROWQ = P
ROW
Q
¡
1 + tmq
¢
(A14)
PMexQ = (P
US
X + λ)
¡
1 + tnq
¢
(A15)
Intermediates
PROWV = P
ROW
V (1 + t
m
z ) (A16)
PUSZ = P
US
Z (1 + t
n
z ) (A17)
Modeling RoO
Constrained demand for US intermediates
ZUS1
ZROW1
(= zR) = RoO =
r
1− r > z
0(=
ZUS0
ZROW0
) (A8b)
(Constrained) unit cost of composite intermediate good
CRZ =
1
φ
·
PUSZ +
PROWZ
RoO
¸"
β
µ
1
RoO
¶σ−1
σ
+ (1− β)
# σ1−σ
(A9b)
Equilibrium
QMexUS = X
US (A18)
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Endogenous variables
XROW
¡
XUS
¢
Mexican apparel exports outside (within) NAFTA
X aggregate supply of Mexican apparel (shirts)
PX unit price of aggregate apparel (shirts)eZ aggregate demand for intermediate good by Mexican producers
ZROW
¡
ZUS
¢
Mexican demand for interm. textiles from ROW (US)
CZ(CRZ ) unrestricted (restricted) unit intermediate cost in Mexican apparel
PV A unit price of value added used in the production of apparel (shirts)
QUS aggregate US demand for imported apparel (shirts)
QROWUS US demand for apparel (shirts) imported from outside NAFTA
QMexUS US demand for Mexican apparel (shirts)
PMexQ US consumer price of Mexican apparel (shirts)
PQUS US consumer price of aggregate apparel (shirts)
P ∗Q US consumer price of apparel (shirts) imported from the ROW
PUSX unit producer price [revenue] of Mexican apparel exported to the US
Exogenous variables and parameters
PROWX Unit revenue of Mexican apparel exported to the ROW
PROWZ (P
US
Z ) unit price of intermediates imported from outside (within) NAFTA
aZ input-output coeﬃcient
RoO Constrained intermediate purchases, i.e. ZUS/ZROW = r/(1− r)
σ Elasticity of substitution in intermediate use
σQ Elasticity of substitution, Mexican vs. ROW apparel
Ω elasticity of substitution in the CET final good allocation function
γ, φ, µ, ψ parameters of CET and CES functions
α, β, δ, θ share parameters of the CET and CES functions
AX [AQ] Calibration parameters in Mexican supply [US demand]
εX Supply elasticity of Mexican apparel
tm MFN tariﬀ
tn NAFTA tariﬀ
λ (Fixed) administrative costs of compliance associated with RoO
ε US apparel price elasticity of import demand
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